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TOTAL PACKAGE PROCUREMENT CONCEPT
Since the award of the contract for the C-5A aircraft, there
have been numerous inquiries with respect to the methodology employed
in the request for proposal, the source selection process, and the
contractual arrangements. These techniques have since become known
formally as the Total Package Procurement Concept. The Air Force is
applying the Concept in the procurement of the SRAM and other weapon
systems; and, with Secretary McNamara's endorsement, it is being
applied to the Navy Fast Deployment Logistic Ship Program.
In view
of this interest, the attached paper was prepared at my request by
Robert H. Turtle, and is based on his active participation in the
C-5A procurement.
The purpose of this paper is to explain the philosophy and
basic tenets of the Concept and the rationale of decisions made in
applying it to the C-5A, in order to provide, from our limited
practical experience to date, a basis for continued analysis and
imaginative adaptation.
The factual material is officially documented. While many of
the conclusions and recommendations are the result of a consensus,
this paper should not be construed as presenting an official Air
Force position nor the position of any one of the many offices that
participated in the development and application of the Concept.
Comprehensive internal and external studies are underway to identify
the lessons learned in the C-5A procurement and to apply that exper
ience in future procurements.
The Concept came to fruition on the C-5A through the team
effort of many individuals throughout the Air Force, and to all
who participated in this massive undertaking, I say, "Well done!"
The constructive attitude and helpful response shown by personnel
of all five competing contractors - Boeing, Douglas, General Electric,
Lockheed, and Pratt & Whitney - afforded the necessary environment
for an objective test of the Concept.
The Total Package Procurement Concept will not by itself do
anything for either the Government or industry, but will be given
purpose only through the ingenuity and sustained efforts of dedi
cated and properly motivated people interested in providing for
National Defense within the structure of a free competitive society.

ROBERT H . CHARLES
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Installations & Logistics)
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The recent announcement of the award of contracts for the
acquisition of a two billion dollar weapon system program by the
Department of Defense1/ resulted in little of the hue and cry over
source selection techniques that had accompanied such announcements
on programs of similar magnitude in the near past. Instead, public
interest was focused on the system itself2/ and the novel procure
ment technique applied to the program. This procurement technique,
colorfully characterized as "womb to tomb" contracting, has, for
want of a similar ingenious title, been officially termed the Total
Package Procurement Concept (TPPC)3/ by the Air Force. The primary
purpose of this article is to define the Concept and explain its
purposes and effects in order to provide from certain limited
practical experience a basis for continued analysis and further re
finement of the TPPC.
II.

THE CONCEPT DEFINED

Most simply stated, the TPPC as conceived by the Air
Force envisions that all anticipated development, production, and
as much support as is feasible of a system throughout its antici
pated life is to be procured as one total package and incorporated
into one contract containing price and performance commitments at
the outset of the acquisition phase of a system procurement.
III.

THE PURPOSE

As is often the case in this complex world, simple state
ments of any kind are in themselves novelties. In order to perceive
the true novelty of the Concept, it is necessary to understand the
sophisticated weapon system acquisition process as practiced in DOD
and codified in the Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) and
related DOD Directives, and as implemented by myriad Service and
Command regulations. Congratulations are proffered to those who
have been initiated into this mystic order; and the following
capsule summary is offered to the uninitiated.
Acquisition and operation of a typical major new weapon
system normally involves the separate negotiation of a development
contract, a separate initial production contract, separate followon production contracts, and contracts for training, spares,
support systems and other operational requirements. The development

1

contract is usually negotiated in a competitive atmosphere, with
emphasis on promises of technical excellence.
(Rarely were such
promises reinforced by binding performance commitments and, if so,
even more rarely were they tied to meaningful and enforceable cost
commitments.) Then, because of the additional time and expense that
would be required if another contractor were chosen for the subse
quent contracts, noncompetitive negotiation with the development
contractor is almost inevitable if the system is to be introduced
into the defense inventory on a timely basis and without duplicating
much of the development effort. The Government was thus engaged in
"iceberg procurement;" it became wedded to a program and to a parti
cular contractor without performance and price commitments, and
without competition, with respect to the operational units in which
it was really interested. And this was done with little visibility
of the underwater portion of the iceberg, including operating costs.
In this environment competition in any form whatsoever is
nonexistent, except on the initial development contract the cost of
which often comprises about 20 per cent of the total cost of contracts
let to acquire and support a major weapon system. Clearly, the
competition for the initial development contract is intense, enhanced
as it is by all that promises to flow to the victor in the ensuing
years of production and operation of the system. Often this intense
competition, itself, results directly in the generation of misleading
cost, performance and schedule estimates which are provided to the
DOD as back-up for the decision to embark upon Operational Systems
Developments4/ programs.
Thus, the history of defense procurement is replete with
cost overruns and less-than-promised performance which were, at
least in part, the results of intentional "buy-in" bidding (where
costs estimates are understated and performance and schedule esti
mates overstated) on the initial contract. And this has been the
case even in situations where there has been no substantial increase
in the then state of the art.
The Government itself must bear much of the blame for the
results of "iceberg procurement." By requiring only an estimate of
performance and cost, the Government forced competitors for new
business to overstate performance and to understate cost. Who is
not going to try to "buy in" when he knows that his competitor can
do so without substantial penalty; and assumes that he will?
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Another recurring theme has been the relatively uniform
rate of profit earned despite extremes in technical performance
and resources management by defense contractors. This is a product
of Cost-Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contracting and of Firm Fixed Price
(FFP) or Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) contracts5/ negotiated in a
noncompetitive atmosphere after development. In short, the princi
pal villains of the piece have been lack of competition and lack
of contractual arrangements which create a climate in which the
efficient are rewarded and the inefficient are not. Massive correc
tive efforts during the last five years have failed to exorcise
these demons. Price competition in the Air Force, the major pur
chaser of complex weapon systems, increased from 14.9% in Fiscal
Year 1961 to only 25.1% in Fiscal Year 1965. And while CPFF con
tracts were reduced during this period from 50.6% to 10.4%, the
target prices for 74.9% of the work in Fiscal Year 1965 were set in
a noncompetitive environment. Targets so established simply in
corporate, in many cases, the then existing efficiencies -- and
inefficiencies -- of the contractor and the lack of attention given
to production methods during the development phase. In fact, under
the general approach to price negotiation on production contracts
of establishing a target profit percentage to be applied to the
Target Cost, the contractor has a negative incentive to design and
manage during the development phase for the lowest production and
operating costs.6/
Five principal benefits are anticipated under a concept
which permits contracts to be awarded competitively under conditions
where performance is related to price on substantially all of a
given program:
1. It requires a tightening of design and configuration
discipline, both in the specifications on which the competitors sub
mit proposals and in the work under contract. On its part, the
Government must be more specific in telling industry what is wanted.
Thus, the system will be better defined before substantial resources
are allocated to it.
2. It inhibits the unrealistic "salesmanship," or "buyin" bidding, including overestimates of performance as well as
underestimates of cost, which is encouraged when commitments are
required on only a small part of the program, and which in the past
has led to performance disappointments, budget disruptions, funding
reallocations, and program stretchouts or cancellations.
3. Being committed to cost and performance figures for
production units before detail design begins, the contractor has a
strong motive to design initially for economical production, and
3

for the reliability and simplicity of maintenance of operational
hardware to which he is committed; all of which are strongly in
fluenced by actions taken during the detail design period, and for
which there is little inducement in the absence of a production
commitment. This should, among other things, minimize production
redesign, reduce the need for subsequent value engineering redesign,
and anticipate and capitalize on new cost reducing machine tool and
other fabrication techniques. It should produce not only lower costs
on the first production units, but, in turn, a lower take-off point
on the production learning curve, thus benefiting every unit in the
production run. And inasmuch as ground equipment, which can repre
sent a large portion of a system, is included in the price of the
total package, the contractor has a positive inducement not only to
design and build such equipment economically, but to design the
system itself so as to require less, or at least less expensive,
ground equipment.
4 . For the same reason, the contractor is motivated to
obtain supplies and services from the most efficient source, whether
in-house or by outside contract. If the prime contractor has
committed himself to deliver an article with a specified performance
for a certain price -- rather than
at whatever the cost may turn out
to be -- and especially if that price has been set competitively,
you can be sure that, with respect
to the approximately 50% of the
work which he obtains from others,
he will use the most effective
ways to obtain the necessary quality at the lowest price -- and how
can he do this other than by bringing into play those very forces
which compel efficiency, namely competition and incentives?
5. Competition is increased at the beginning, thereby
decreasing the need for subsequent competitive reprocurement of
components, with all the drawbacks that this entails. When a compo
nent has been originally built by or under the direction of a prime
contractor and is then put out for competitive bidding and is built
by another company, a risk concerning the integrity of the system as
a whole is created, complete interchangeability of the component is
threatened, and a difficult-enough logistics problem is further
complicated by a new part and part number.
6. When commitments are established in competition, the
winner is forced to be efficient. There is a natural desire to
excel. Competition transforms this desire into necessity. And the
resulting efficiency benefits not only the buyer, but the seller.
He is then in a better position to compete for the next round of
business, and in other markets.
4

7.
It permits the Department to make a choice be
competing contractors based, not on mere estimates, but on binding
commitments concerning the performance and price of what is really
required -- operational equipment.
Inasmuch as application of the TPPC to a program is not
feasible until the technological building blocks are in hand and
the operational hardware requirement, both qualitative and quanti
tative, can be specified with reasonable precision and with reason
able expectation that it can be achieved, the advent of this
procurement technique has had to await the growth of complementary
planning and scientific management techniques. Presently, Weapon
Systems Analysis and Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E) reviews are directed toward insuring that these conditions
are met prior to the initiation of Operational Systems Development.
Concept Formulation and Contract Definition required by DDR&E as a
prerequisite to full-scale development7/ provides the building
blocks for the TPPC. Thus, today, given Systems Analysis to
establish our hardware requirements and Concept Formulation and
Contract Definition to provide a reasonable expectation that they
can be achieved, we no longer need to separate development from
production for contractual purposes. We can lump the two together.
In fact, we can go further and add much of the support, including
spares, training and support systems and contractor technical
services.
IV.

EFFECT ON STANDARD PROCUREMENT PRACTICES.

Application of the Concept has an impact on all phases
of standard Government procurement practices beginning with the
Request for Proposals (RFP) issued for Contract Definition (CD)
and including the selection of CD contractors, the Work Statement
of the CD contract, the proposals submitted for the development and
production contract, the selection of the winning competitor, the
type of contract awarded, and the management of the program.
A.

Precontract.

It is impractical and probably unnecessary to treat
the changes in all of these steps in detail in an article of this
kind. It should be realized, however, that planning for a Total
Package buy must begin prior to and be incorporated into the initial
RFP for CD. In order to obtain maximum benefit from the Concept,
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competition must be maintained during the entire period in which
the contractor prepares his cost and technical proposals for a Total
Package contract, and this requires efforts of at least two contrac
tors during this period and the ensuing selection period. Moreover,
preparation for a Total Package proposal will usually require the
application of greater resources and time than that required for
preparation of a "development only" proposal.
Preparation of an RFP for the CD phase of a Total
Package procurement may also require the allocation of greater DOD
resources, since the desired response will cover production and
support as well as development. In order to assure the maximum
degree of comparability between competitive proposals, the RFP
package should contain a model of the Total Package contract. While
the terms of this proposed contract can be revised during and after
CD, it is always helpful in source selection to be able to compare
the contractors' responses in a common frame of reference.
Application of the Concept precludes the selection of
a CD contractor who lacks production capability. Such a contractor
would not normally participate in CD even if a Total Package procure
ment were not intended; but production capability is a mandatory
requirement for the accomplishment of a Total Package CD as will
become evident from the Work Statement of a Total Package CD con
tract. Whereas the Work Statement of a CD contract preceding a
development contract only requires the preparation of firm prices
or targets on the development phase of the contract with estimates
for production and operational support, the Work Statement of a
Total Package CD contract requires the preparation of firm prices
or targets on development, production, operational support, and may
require guarantees of operating costs as well.
In addition to the additional data that must be sub
mitted to the Government in support of a Total Package proposal, the
contractor must engage in in-depth analysis and projection of cost
figures, and in all probability, initiate some preliminary design
efforts in order to provide himself with the required degree of
confidence inherent in a Total Package commitment. Inasmuch as this
commitment extends to operational performance and schedule as well,
the contractor must likewise have a high degree of confidence in his
preliminary plans with a consequent shift of a substantial portion
of his workload to the CD period. The advantages and disadvantages
of this early emphasis will be considered later in this article.
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In short, the proposal submitted during CD must,
in order to be responsive, contain firm commitments to operational
performance, to development, production, and support costs, and to
the operational hardware delivery schedule.
B.

Source Selection.

A principal purpose of the TPPC is to engender the
highest degree of competition on as much of a program as is possible.
The degree of competition achieved is a function of the extent,
form and intensity of the competition. These factors are, in turn,
a direct result of the stated basis of source selection and award8/ .
As discussed earlier the extent of competition in an
Operational System Development Program seldom exceeds 20% of the
total program eventually put on contract. The most prevalent forms
of competition in Government procurement practice are price compe
tition and technical competition.
Price competition and technical competition in the
framework of prior Government procurements have been inverse
variables. That is, where technical competition is primary, prices
both on development and production could be expected to rise. Con
versely, where the acquisition cost was the primary consideration,
technology in terms of operational performance could be expected to
suffer.
The principle of price competition was adhered to in
formally advertised procurements where the Government could state
with detailed specificity the exact item that it wished to procure
after experience had shown that an optimum cost/performance mix
could be obtained at that performance level. Where, because of
lack of prior acquisition and operating experience, the Government
could not specify with the requisite detail the exact nature of the
hardware it wished to acquire, prime emphasis was placed on techni
cal excellence and cost remained to be negotiated with the winning
competitor.
The Concept allows a unique opportunity to expand the
extent, form and intensity of the competition for selection as the
program contractor. This is accomplished by basing the source
selection on the cost effectiveness of the anticipated operational
quantity in an operational environment over a period of time equal
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to the anticipated first-line utilization of the system. This
approach has previously been utilized by DOD to select systems for
acquisition from the myriad systems proposed by the Services, and
is a concise summary of the Government'
s ultimate goal in weapon
systems evolution.
It is only logical then that this method for compari
son of items with dissimilar cost and performance attributes be used
to select a source for the chosen system in order to optimize the
most performance/least cost equation. The Cost side of a cost
effectiveness formula considers development, production, support,
maintenance, construction, and operating costs of an operational
system over a period of useful life. The Productivity side of the
formula considers the useful output of that number of systems over
an equal period of time. This type of evaluation is never easy, but
the detailed planning prior to initiation of CD and the firm commit
ments to development, production, and support costs, as well as
operational performance and delivery schedule obtained from the con
tractor'
s Total Package proposal make it possible.
Both price and technical competition are engendered on
the development, production, and support of the system since the allinclusive Contract Price will comprise a substantial part of the cost
side of the formula, while the concurrent technological considera
tions as they pertain to operational capability will be reflected in
the productivity figures and in maintenance, investment and operating
cost figures.
Total Package contracting does not require awards to
be made to the low bidder. It does require performance and price
commitments by competitors, and the award can then be made after
considering all factors in an integrated, meaningful manner. In
this connection, it should be borne in mind that in most techno
logically advanced weapon systems, performance standing by itself
is more important than price standing by itself, but that the two
factors should and usually can be related.
C.

Contract.

Assuming that the competitive atmosphere engendered in
a Total Package CD results in desirable commitments to Cost, Per
formance and Schedule, a final contractual document embodying all of
these commitments must be structured. In order to facilitate the
8

incorporation of these commitments into a definitive document,
it is desirable to have the proposed contract executed by each
competitor in definitive form prior to the announcement of the
selected source. In order to assure the attainment of the pro
posed Cost, Performance and Schedule commitments made by the con
tractor in CD, the contract should establish these characteristics
as firm obligations rather than as goals. Thus, a cost-type contract
would be inappropriate in a Total Package procurement.
Similarly, a Work Statement and specifications estab
lishing certain performance and schedule levels as goals, rather
than firm requirements, would likewise fail to retain the advan
tages of a competitive CD. Whether the contract should be FFP or
FPI (and if FPI, the ceiling and sharing arrangement) should be
determined on a case-by-case basis after consideration of the
degree of risk inherent in the program and with the realization
that the contractor is being asked to make production and operating
cost as well as performance commitments prior to full-scale develop
ment of the system.
This uncertainty may result in all competitors
allowing large reserves for purposes of meeting contingencies under
an FFP contract. Thus, in most cases a FPI contract is best suited
to Total Package procurements. The contract will cover the develop
ment, test and production of the operational hardware required,
including support and training equipment, together with prices or
pricing formulae for spares and support or training services re
quired of the contractor in the operational phase.
Conceivably, each of these categories could be priced
or targeted separately, but a single price in the case of an FFP,
or target price and ceiling in the case of an FPI contract, is
preferable, inasmuch as it allows a contractor the greatest lati
tude in meeting the operational requirement, guards against trade
offs that may be inimical to the Government'
s best interest and is
administratively easier than computation of separate incentive fees
and ceilings. In addition to progress payments, presumably billing
prices would be used on long-term contracts to allow for a recoup
ment of unrecovered costs as certain work is performed or hardware
is delivered.
1. Work Statement. Development, test, production,
support and training equipment and services to cover the operational
hardware throughout its planned useful life may be stated as a firm
contract requirement, or may be stated in part as priced options.
Use of an option technique is especially desirable where quantita
tive requirements may be revised during the course of a program.
9

Obtaining a target price proposal for option increments does not do
violence to the theory of Total Package procurement, since the con
tractor, by virtue of his commitment contingent only upon the Govern
ment's decision, must prepare his proposal and plan for the develop
ment and production of the hardware as if the requirement were firm.
Utilization of several alternate option arrange
ments in the RFP provides the Government with flexibility in struc
turing the definitive Total Package contract work statement. De
sirable options may be carried over into the Definitive Contract to
allow the Government flexibility even after award of a Total Package
contract. It should be realized, however, that requesting proposals
on alternate bases may raise the cost of CD. Further, incorporating
options in the work statement of the Definitive Contract may result
in paying a higher price for the combined contract requirement and
option increments than could be obtained by including the option in
crements in the original contract requirement. This can be minimized
by including enough production units in the contract requirement so
that the contractor will have the facilities with which to produce
the option increments on hand and by establishing the number of units
in each increment and the lead time for exercise of the option so as
to provide for economical materials purchasing and handling and
continuous production.
Where it appears reasonable to expect that the
total number of production units ultimately required will equal or
exceed the contract requirement and priced option increments, con
sideration should be given to establishing the entire combined amount
as the contract requirement. In that case, the savings to the Govern
ment, if any, to be earned by placing all production units on con
tract must be weighed against the possibility of termination costs
should the Government's quantitative requirement be decreased. In
this connection, the limitation of the Government's obligation
clause9/ which provides a ceiling on total cost to the Government
should the program be terminated provides a tool for ready comparisons.
2. Special Provisions. Once having established the
type of contract, i.e., FFP or FPI, and the Contract Requirements,
i.e., development, production quantities, including training and
support equipment and services, spares and contract options on the
above, it remains to establish certain contractual procedures to (1)
maintain the validity of the established target prices during the
course of the program (2) provide reasonable protection for the con
tractor against cost increases that are beyond his control, and (3)
encourage the contractor to exceed, where economically possible, the
price, performance and schedule commitments contained in the Total
Package contract.
To these ends , Total Package procurement has
engendered or utilized certain new contract clauses designed to
10

accomplish the above requirements. While many of these clauses
have potential application beyond the TPPC, they are especially
useful in, and in fact were created to deal with, problems arising
out of such procurements.
a. Maintaining commitments. The problem of main
taining throughout the life of the program the price, performance
and schedule commitments so carefully established in competition
is first in order of time, and possibly importance.
The weakest points in the chain leading from
competitively established initial contract commitments to final con
tract realizations are those situations in which the contract is re
opened for negotiation during the course of the program and there
fore on a sole source basis. These situations, because of the
changing nature of defense requirements, are not rare or unusual
occurrences and must be provided for under the contract. Usually
they are a consequence of a Government directed or approved varia
tion from the contract work statement in the areas of (1) drawings,
designs, or specifications (2) delivery schedules, or (3) quanti
ties. Pursuant to the "Changes" and "Termination for Convenience"
clauses of the contract, equitable adjustments to the contract must
be negotiated for such deviations.
By far the most frequent opportunity for
negotiation occurs in the area of changes to the drawings, designs,
or specifications. These changes cannot be avoided entirely since
often they incorporate some technical advance or result from a
change in requirements arising from a change in defense strategy.
There is no doubt, however, that historically many specification
changes have been unnecessary and have increased program costs by a
greater margin than the benefits derived therefrom.
The problem has been to devise techniques that
would discourage both Contractor and Government program managers
from making unwarranted changes in the system being acquired, while
not discouraging valid technical improvements. Government represen
tatives can be directed not to make unnecessary changes, but the
Contractor cannot be prohibited from initiating them and attempting
to gain Government approval. By far the most effective technique
for dealing with this problem is to reduce the problem itself. This
can be done by expressing what the Government wants, not in terms of
detail or parts specifications, but in terms of operational per
formance. In such case, there is no need to make a change in the
contract itself if a drawing or a detail specification is changed.
i . Price Commitments. While the Department
has experimented with various changes in pricing arrangements, the
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general practice has been to negotiate the same profit percentage
on changes as was negotiated on the basic contract. In order to
provide the Contractor with a reduced incentive to initiate changes,
a new pricing structure has been proposed. This initial attempt at
limiting changes has taken the form of eliminating the contractor's
target profit on changes over a certain base percentage amount pur
suant to a contractually established specification change pricing
clause.
Acceleration and deceleration in rate of
hardware delivery and related services is not unusual in Defense
programs. These variations, dictated by changes in the world situa
tion, are often beyond the predictive capability of the planners.
The use of a single long-term contract rather than annual negotia
tion increases the potential for variations from the contract de
livery schedule. This potential may be decreased by initially estab
lishing a reasonable and economical delivery schedule.
Initially, delivery rate is a function of
the resources and facilities allocated to production. Thus, the
contractor initially tools and arranges facilities for a certain
delivery rate dictated by the Government after an assessment of the
quantities and time period in which the hardware must be introduced
into the Defense inventory. Historically, and in the absence of
changed requirements, the rate so established has been constant
throughout the majority of the contract period with deviations
occurring only in the build-up and tapering off time phases. This
constant rate approach is usually not the most efficient over the
entire contract period, since learning benefits derived during a
production program often allow for an increase in rate at little or
no increase in facilities and tooling, and thus, a consequent de
crease in fixed costs per production unit.
This loss of economy becomes a problem of
even greater magnitude as the contract period is expanded from
annual production increments to a Total Package buy. It is there
fore imperative that in a Total Package buy serious consideration
and analysis be devoted to the initial establishment of a delivery
schedule which, within the limitations of military necessity, allows
for most economical production.
Moreover, past experiences indicate that
despite the aforementioned potential for greater economy by in
creases in delivery rates as the production program progresses,
schedule changes, whether compressions or stretchouts, have resulted
in the negotiation of price increases. On the assumption that a
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substantial portion of such increases can be related to negotia
tions in a sole source environment, it is essential that such
negotiations be eliminated to the greatest extent possible. There
fore, a Total Package contract should, if possible, initially
establish definite alternate target prices for variations from the
initial delivery schedule. In such a case the Department will
retain both the flexibility necessary to protect the Nation's mili
tary posture and the ability to exercise this flexibility without
losing the advantages of target prices established in competition.
Further, the ability to establish in advance the additional costs
or savings resulting from a contemplated change in delivery schedule
is an important tool in deciding whether a change should be made.
In a contract which calls for development,
production, and services in finite amounts over a substantial
period of time, attention must be given to the possibility of a
change in quantitative requirements resulting in a termination of
the program short of delivery of the original contract quantities.
Generally, such terminations for the convenience of the Government
are accomplished under a specific contract clause which allows for
an agreement between the contractor and the contracting officer on
the amount to be paid the contractor by reason of a total or partial
termination. This amount may include a reasonable profit on work
already accomplished. The major limitation on this amount is that
it may not exceed the contract price (the ceiling price in incentive
contracts) less any sums already paid and less the contract price
(ceiling price) of any work remaining on the contract.
In a Total Package situation, given the
length of the contract and the myriad tasks to be accomplished
thereunder, application of this principle would leave an enormous
area for negotiation, especially if termination occurred in the
early years of a program. In order to limit this enlarged area of
negotiation, a limitation, similar to the contract (ceiling) price
limitation imposed on annual contracts, should be established at
the outset of the program for each year of the anticipated program.
Such a limitation of the Government's obligation would be based on
the anticipated annual production costs, plus advanced buy require
ments for long lead time items, plus an amount for contingent
termination liability should the program be terminated during a
particular program year.
ii. Performance Commitments. In the past,
the Department has relied on an Inspection Clause to assure that
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items delivered and accepted met the contract requirements. Pur
suant to this clause, acceptance becomes conclusive on the matter
of meeting contract requirements except as regards latent defects,
fraud, or other such gross mistakes as amount to fraud. Utilization
of this clause has engendered many problems, since it is often diffi
cult to determine whether a sophisticated item of equipment meets
contract requirements until it is placed in an operational environ
ment. Recognition of this problem had led to the creation of the
Correction of Deficiencies Clause to be found in recent Air Force
major weapon system acquisition contracts. This clause created a
type of warranty of useability in an attempt to assure compliance
with certain contract requirements relating to operational perform
ance.
Difficulties experienced with both the
Inspection and the existing Correction of Deficiencies Clauses, even
in situations where a complete development test program had been
accomplished prior to establishing operational performance require
ments for individual items of hardware, led inevitably to the conclu
sion that such difficulties would be intensified in a program which
establishes operational performance requirements prior to the develop
ment effort. Realizing that commitments to operational performance
of hardware are of little value in the absence of adequate testing
and corrective procedures requires that attention be directed to a
revised contractual provision allowing for such procedures.
A primary purpose of such a clause should
be to extend, where necessary, the period of time within which
actionable defects may be discovered so that the Department is af
forded an opportunity to test and inspect each item of hardware in an
operational environment. Usually this can be accomplished by adding
a reasonable period to the date of final acceptance of an item of
hardware to allow for operating experience.
However, in a Total Package procurement,
some operational hardware will usually be delivered before all develop
ment testing has been completed and, therefore, allowance must be
made for a reasonable period of time after acceptance and after com
pletion of development testing to allow for operational experience.
Further, the clause should provide a definite procedure for the
timely execution of decisions after a defect is discovered. Thus,
discovery of a defect should trigger a timely notification of the
defect by one party to the other, a timely request for a proposal for
corrective actions, containing estimates of correction costs, and a
direction by the Department of Defense that the defect be corrected
in whole or in part, or not at all.
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Moreover, the Department should retain
the ability to direct, with regard to each item of hardware, either
that the defect be fully corrected, partially corrected, or not
corrected, and in the case of less than complete correction there
should be an equitable reduction in Target Cost, Target Price and
Ceiling Price. In the case of corrections to be made in whole or
in part, the time and place of corrective action should likewise
remain a prerogative of the Government. Decisions to correct in
whole or in part and the amount of an equitable adjustment should
be based upon a comparison of the portion of correction costs to
be borne by the Government with productivity differentials over the
anticipated useful life of the system.
iii.
Schedule Commitments.
area in which the Contractor has made commitments is that of
delivery schedules. The value and cost effectiveness of a weapon
system are often substantially influenced by the timing of its
introduction into the operational inventory. Extra-contractual
program elements must be planned for and timed to coincide with the
delivery schedule contained in the contract. Thus, time is of the
essence in these contracts. However, establishing actual damages
for failure of timely delivery is a difficult task because of the
necessary flexibility of the military establishment and the limi
tations imposed on the dissemination of information regarding
military posture and alternatives. Consequently, the DOD has
historically endured untimely delivery and the resulting expenses
rather than take legal action to establish and recover damages.
Recently, a liquidated damages approach
has been taken wherein the value of use of a system is determined
by considering the costs of obtaining comparable performance from
existing systems over the period of delinquent delivery. In this
manner reasonable assessments of potential damage can be derived
at the outset of the program and can be included in the contract
as liquidated damages for late delivery.
b. Protection Against Unreasonable Risk. Commit
ments to performance, price, and delivery of operational hardware
(made prior to full-scale development of the hardware) impose a
higher degree of risk upon the defense contractor than he has been
required to assume in the past. In order to assure that this
degree of risk is not so high as to be unreasonable and conse
quently necessitate the inclusion of unreasonably high contingency
factors in proposals, the contract should be structured so as to
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reflect that risk and to exclude, insofar as is possible, responsi
bility for contingencies beyond the contractor's control.
i. Contract Types. Certain development
production contingencies may be covered by the type of contract
awarded. Thus, as previously observed, an FFP Contract is not
usually appropriate in a Total Package procurement. Instead, an FPI
Contract seems to have a better chance of balancing the objectives
of firm commitments against the potential for unreasonable risk.
The balance that is struck is usually a function of the relationship
of Target Cost to Ceiling Price and the Incentive Sharing Arrange
ment which governs the costs to be borne by the parties within that
area. Thus, when a contractor proposes a Target Cost, he will not
automatically incur an out-of-pocket loss if actual costs exceed the
Target Cost and Target Profit. To be sure, a diminution in antici
pated profit will result, but this is a more reasonable risk to
assume. Development and production risk is within the contractor's
control to some extent and is increased or decreased by the conserva
tism or optimism expressed in his cost proposal.
Many studies have been undertaken on the
optimum relationship between risk assumed and Ceiling Price and
Incentive Share. Suffice it to say that the Ceiling Price should be
high enough above Target Price to allow for some consideration of
development and production contingencies without invalidating the
price commitments, and the Incentive Share should be high enough to
encourage efficiency without imposing unreasonable risk.
ii. Escalation. In addition to the risks
inherent in performing development and production work arising from
the potential for deviations from the development and production
work plans, there are always risks inherent in estimating the costs
of the anticipated work required. These risks are minimized by
annual contract negotiations, and conversely are magnified by exten
sion of a contract over longer periods of time. Requiring price
commitments for an entire program at the outset increases this risk
in proportion to the length of the contract period.
Thus, consideration should be given to
affording the contractor a reasonable degree of protection from un
foreseeable changes in the national economy as reflected in appro
priate Bureau of Labor Standards Indices. Further, where labor
represents a substantial portion of prime contract and material
costs, consideration should likewise be given to protecting the
contractor from labor-associated cost changes that are beyond his
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control, particularly those which are within the control of the
Government. Thus, substantial cost deviations arising from
changes in Federal Statutes governing work conditions and fringe
benefits should be the responsibility of the Government.
c. Motivation to Exceed Commitments. While
competition and hard-nosed negotiation can be expected to obtain
for the Government the most desirable cost and performance commit
ments reasonably available at the outset of a program, the poten
tial longevity of a Total Package contract adds emphasis to the
need for encouraging the contractor to meet or better his commit
ments during the course of the program.
Similarly, the length of a Total Package
program affords the contractor more opportunity to improve upon
his commitments, either by taking advantage of new technological
developments occurring during the program period or by management
action leading to greater cost efficiencies. Given these oppor
tunities, it remains to provide suitable incentives to assure that
they will be seized upon by the contractor.
i. Cost Incentive (including Flexible Cost
Incentive). Total Package contracting poses a dilemma: Is there
too much risk?; and if the risk is contained, how can the contrac
tor be motivated to produce high quality at low cost? A fixed
incentive formula with steep cost sharing may force competitors
to include, in their target cost bids, contingency factors which
later prove to be unnecessary. On the other hand, a fixed incentive
formula with a mild incentive will not adequately motivate, during
development, economy of production design, product reliability, and
simplicity of maintenance, and will not adequately discourage the
performance of work in-house that could more efficiently be per
formed by outside contract. What is needed is a contractual
arrangement which, without exposing the winning competitor to too
much risk, will nevertheless motivate him as if he had that risk.
In recognition of the dual desire to
temper the risk of a life-cycle Total Package program entered into
competitively, and simultaneously to provide a sufficiently strong
incentive to motivate high quality at low cost, a cost incentive
formula has been developed that provides that the contractor's
share in cost overruns and underruns, which may start out at a
relatively mild figure, may be adjusted voluntarily and unilaterally
by the contractor during the performance of the contract, so that if
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he can reduce his costs, he will be able to generate higher incen
tive profits by increasing his share in cost underruns. Such ad
justments will, for all practical purposes, operate prospectively
only and may be made only within clearly defined limitations.
As in the case of the usual incentive
contract, this flexible incentive will require the establishment of
a target cost, a target profit, a ceiling price, and an initial
cost-sharing arrangement for deviations from the target cost, for
example 15%. The key difference is that as the work progresses, the
contractor will be permitted, from time to time, to change his share
in cost overruns and underruns by electing a higher or lower "incre
mental” share on the work then remaining to be performed. The
various incremental shares, thus weighted to reflect the percentage
of work performed while each incremental share is in effect, will
be combined to produce a "composite" share which will ultimately be
used to determine the contractor's cost reward or penalty.
The following limitations on this unila
teral right on the part of the contractor have been used:
(1)

The contractor's maximum incremental

share will be 50%.
(2) The contractor may not change his
share before 25% of after 75% of the target cost has been incurred,
nor more frequently than once a year.
(3) An incremental share may not be lower
than half of the immediately preceding incremental share, and in no
case lower than the share initially established in competition.
Thus, an initial share of 15%, a 50%
restriction on incremental shares and a prohibition against increas
ing the share before 25% of the work has been performed, limits the
maximum composite cost share to 41 1/4% computed as follows:
.15 incremental Share x .25 expended

=

.0375

.50 incremental share x .75 unexpended

=

.3750
.4125

In order to encourage the contractor
voluntarily to steepen his cost share (which would represent greater
risk), and to do so as soon as possible, thus increasing the
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motivation desired, the formula provides an increase in the target
profit in the amount of 15% of any increase in the contractor'
s
composite share, multiplied by the amount of work remaining on the
date of election. This automatically places a premium on in
creasing the share as soon as possible.
For example, if the maximum incremental
share of 50% is elected when only 25% of the work has been per
formed, the contractor'
s actual profit will be greater until his
actual cost exceeds the target cost by 11 l/4% , than if he had
made no election. If the maximum share is elected when 50% of the
work has been performed, this break-even point is reached when
actual costs exceed the target by 7½%; and if such election occurs
when 75% of the work has been performed, the break-even point is
at 3 3/4% of the target cost. There is also a reduction in the
target profit, similarly calculated, whenever the contractor
elects to decrease his cost share.
To illustrate, if the contractor elects
a 407o incremental share after 25% of the target cost has been
expended, and subsequently elects a 20% incremental share after
50% of the target cost has been expended, his target profit will
first be increased by 2.109375% , and then reduced by 0.75%, for a
net increase of 1.35975%, computed as follows:
Change in
Target Profit
.15 incremental share x .25 expended
=
.40 incremental share x .75 unexpended =
composite share

.0375
.3000
.3375

.3375 new composite share
.15
previous share
.1875 increase in composite share x .15 =
.028125 x .75 remaining work =
.15
.40
.20

incrementalshare x .25 expended
=
incrementalshare x .25 expended
=
incrementalshare x .50 unexpended =
composite share

.0375
.1000
.1000
.2375

.3375 previous composite share
.2375 new composite share
.1000 decrease in composite share x .15 =
- .015 x .50 remaining work =
Net Increase in Target Profit
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+ .02109375

- .0075
+ .0135975

The net effect is that the contractor is
permitted to earn a genuinely handsome profit, both from the in
crease in target profit and from a greater share in cost savings,
if he is willing to go to a steeper share early in the program; but
the opportunities for increased profit diminish as he gets further
down the road and the risk decreases. The formula is thus deli
berately designed to induce the contractor to try, from the begin
ning, to get into a position to increase his profit, both by a
higher share ratio and by a higher target profit; and he can get
into that position only by controlling his costs as early as
possible, while concurrently assuring himself that his technical
performance and schedule commitments are being met.
This contractual arrangement does not
present the possibility of excessive profit. In the extreme case,
a maximum 507, incremental share elected after 25% of work completion
involves a target profit of 12.953125% and a composite cost share of
41¼ % . If the actual cost is 107, under target, the incentive profit
will be 4.125% , and the total profit will be 17.078125% of target
cost, or 18.97577, of actual cost. But a 10% cost underrun, while
possible if the target is set without competition, is unlikely if
set under conditions of adequate competition. An underrun of this
magnitude under competitive conditions would most likely mean, not
a windfall profit, but that the contractor is in fact truly effi
cient.
One of the objectives of the TPPC is to
provide a greater profit spread in order to encourage efficiency,
and where the circumstances permit it the best way to do so is to
set the target competitively and permit the ultimate profit to be
determined by the efficiency of the winning competitor.
Of greater concern than unusually high
profits is the fact that the winning competitor may have set too
difficult a target, thereby creating a situation where the proba
bility of exceeding the target is much greater than that of an
underrun. This risk, of course, is ameliorated by the low initial
cost share, and the fact that the winning competitor is not re
quired to increase that share.
In order to help the Government to de
termine whether to use a fixed or flexible cost incentive in a Total
Package procurement, it may, under appropriate circumstances, be
appropriate to ask the competitors to submit alternate bids, on both
bases.
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ii. Performance Incentives. It is antici
pated that where the basis of award is life cycle cost effective
ness, each bidder will submit a proposal setting forth the highest
performance standards he is confident of attaining, since the
Department of Defense will give consideration, in the competition,
to the benefits to be realized from any performance standards in
excess of the RFP requirements. The contract awarded to the
winning competitor will incorporate the proposed standards as the
minimum acceptable contract standards; and the contractor will be
required to meet these standards under the Correction of Defi
ciencies clause.
Nevertheless, the Department may desire
to incorporate incentives for achieving performance superior to
the standards specified in the contract. Of particular interest
is a total incentive formula, including productivity, expressed in
terms of costs (development, production, investment, manpower,
training, spares, maintenance, fuel), thereby allowing the Contrac
tor the greatest latitude in increasing productivity per dollar.
The dollar levels of such performance
rewards should be determined on the basis of value to the Depart
ment of any cost effectiveness increase over the anticipated total
utilization during the period of first line use of the system.
The performance reward should be equal to an amount derived by
applying the Contractor'
s overrun/underrun share to this predicted
value. Thus, in the case of a transportation system that will
produce 28 billion ton-miles at $.05 a ton-mile on the basis of the
contract performance requirements, a reduction in the cost per tonmile of 2% or $ .001 would be worth 28 million dollars to the Depart
ment.
Therefore, this performance increase is
desirable if it can be obtained for a total cost to the Government
of anything less than 28 million dollars. This 28-million-dollar
figure must cover both the Government's share of the increased
development and production costs and the contractor's performance
reward. The Contractor will be motivated to attain this performance
increase only if his share of increased costs of development and
production is less than his performance reward. A simple equation
can be derived by treating "less than" as "equal to." Thus, the
Department desires the Government share of increased costs (IC)
plus performance reward (PR) to equal value (V), while the Contrac
tor desires the Contractor share in increased costs (IC) to equal
performance reward (PR).
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If value (V) is 28 million dollars, and
the Incentive Share is 85/15, the Government is willing to pay a
total of 28 million dollars in increased costs plus performance
reward, or
.85IC + PR = 28 M.
The Contractor is willing to provide the increased performance, if
his performance reward (PR) is equal to his share in increased
costs (IC), or
.15IC = PR
Substitution, to make Government and Contractor trade-offs identical
results in PR being equal to 4.2 million, or the Contractor share in
increased costs multiplied by the value of the increased performance.
In the case of a flexible cost incentive
contract, the performance reward should initially be established by
application of the initial cost share specified in the formula and
automatic adjustments to the performance reward should be made as
the cost share varies in order to maintain the trade-off motivation
balance originally established. This can be accomplished by multi
plying the original performance reward by the new composite cost
share and dividing by the initial cost share to establish the new
performance reward level.
D.

Administration.

Department of Defense procedures for program manage
ment and control and for administration of contracts were largely
evolved in an environment of cost-type contracting. In such an
environment, cost and performance requirements are established as
goals and the Government and the contractor work hand-in-hand as
partners toward meeting or exceeding them. In some instances, the
Government could almost be considered the senior partner since it
held and exercised the power of the purse. The advent of fixedprice type contracts alleviated the need for some of this Government
control, if not the controls themselves.
Nevertheless, where operational performance and opera
tional hardware price had not been fixed, as in the development
phase of a new system, Government control in some areas remained
vital. Clearly, when a contractor has made realistic contractual
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commitments to price, performance, and delivery of operational
equipment, the need for Government control of the program is
further minimized, and cost and performance incentives can be
structured so as to give every assurance that the contractor will
be motivated to seize upon opportunities to reduce costs and im
prove performance, and that where faced with alternatives he will
choose the course that is most beneficial to the Government.
However, the Department of Defense is not only a
trustee of public funds but is also the guardian of the national
defense, and thus cannot afford to wait with check-in-hand for the
timely delivery of operational hardware meeting the contract
requirements, but must act throughout the acquisition phase to
provide reasonable assurance that the requirements of national
defense will be met in a timely manner. A balance must, there
fore, be struck between overcontrol and a complete hands-off
attitude. The potential for damage to the national defense
posture arising from a contractor'
s failure to fulfill his
contractual commitments must be weighed against the costs of
Government control and the potential for increased program costs,
technical deficiencies and slippages arising from Government
interference in the program management. Simply stated, where
there are appropriate contractual terms, the Government should
avoid detail control, but should retain sufficient visibility of
the work to permit prompt action if control is in fact required.
V.

THE AIR FORCE EXPERIENCE

To date, the TPPC has been applied up to contract award
on only one system: the Air Force's C-5A, a heavy logistics air
transport system capable of carrying outsized cargo over long
ranges at speeds comparable to present commercial jet transports.
Other programs have been identified for Total Package procurement
in all of the Services and are in various preliminary stages.
Although the C-5A is the first Total Package procurement,
the Total Package Concept is not the only first for the C-5A
acquisition program. The C-5A is also the first system to undergo
a comprehensive contract definition pursuant to DOD Directive
3200.9 and the first system in which the complete Air Force Systems
Command 375 series of program management documents have been
applied from the outset.
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An RFP, containing, among other things, a Work Statement
and Model Contract for CD, and a Work Statement and Model Contract
for development and acquisition of the C-5A system, was distributed
on December 11, 1964, to the three airframe and two engine contrac
tors who had participated in the parametric studies leading up to
the approval of the C-5A program. On December 31, 1964, the Air
Force entered into a CD contract with each of the five contractors,
the Work Statement of which called for the identification of, and
preparation of performance specifications for, each end item re
quired for an operational system, as well as a price proposal for
development, production, and support of such hardware. Support
would include all required aeronautical ground equipment, training
equipment and contractor technical services, together with spares
and maintenance through the Category II Test Period. Spares beyond
Category II would be added to the contract by provisioning action
and would be priced in accordance with a detailed pricing exhibit
or a pricing formula stated in the contract.
Award of a contract would be made to the source whose cost
and technical proposals as evaluated by the Air Force demonstrated
the greatest overall cost effectiveness over a 10-year operating
period of a system complying with all of the minimum performance
requirements established in the RFP. To this end, the contractor
was required to prepare a 10-year operating cost estimate on certain
given assumptions. This was to be added to the RDT&E and production
costs and compared with the productivity of the proposed system over
the same period. Although the initial production airframe buy was
only 57 systems, a priced option was obtained on 58 more, and costs
and productivity for source selection purposes was to be computed on
a buy of 115 total operational systems.
The technical proposals were submitted on April 20, 1965
and the cost proposals on April 27, 1965. Definitive FPI contracts
for RDT&E, delivery of 57 total systems, and support as outlined
above, were negotiated and signed by each of the contractors prior
to the Source Selection announcement on September 30, 1965.
The contract delivery schedule for total systems was based
on the airframe contractors "most economic production" estimate
designed to meet a December 1969 date for an operational capability
of one squadron. The engine contract delivery schedule was in turn
constructed to meet the total system schedule in the most economical
manner. In both contracts, the development test plan, including
timing and hardware to be used in test, was based upon the contrac
tor's proposal for the most economic plan meeting the Air Force's
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test data requirements. Both contracts contained alternate prices
for delivery schedule changes and a specification change pricing
clause designed to inhibit the initiation of specification changes.
Priced options in each contract will enable the Government
to order up to 58 additional total systems, and formula options can
be exercised to order up to 85 additional systems beyond the priced
quantity of 115. Each contract provides for a target profit equal
to 107, of the target cost and a ceiling price equal to 130% of
target cost. Priced options will be added to targets and ceiling
as they are exercised, as will provisioned spares, and the final
incentive fee computation will be made on the basis of the 115
total systems and support. The formula option for an additional 85
total systems will be exercised in a separate fixed-price incentive
contract with a 10% target profit and a 120% ceiling price.
Both the engine and airframe contracts contain an escala
tion clause to protect against abnormal fluctuations in the economy.
Both contracts contain a clause providing for adjustments to targets
and ceilings in the event of changes in the Federal Laws affecting
labor-associated costs, and a clause providing for limited (but not
"get well") adjustments in the option prices if actual production
costs on the first 57 systems deviate substantially from the ori
ginally targeted production costs.
Both contractors proposed on the basis of three alternate
cost-incentive formulas, 85/15 over target and 50/50 under, 70/30
over target and 50/50 under, and the flexible incentive with an
initial share of 85/15 over and under target. The target prices
proposed indicated a preference for the flexible incentive. Never
theless, since the airframe contractor was willing to accept a
70/30 overrun share, and the consequently greater risk involved,
at a relatively small increase in target price, the Air Force chose
the 70/30 - 50/50 formula for the airframe contract, while in
serting the flexible incentive in the engine contract. Neither
contract provides for the construction or provision of additional
Government facilities beyond those presently used by the contractors
Performance incentives in both contracts have, to the
extent feasible, undertaken to arrive at specific overall per
formance attributes. Rewards for increases in such overall per
formance characteristics have been computed on the basis of value
to the Air Force in an operational environment of a three-squadron
quantity over a 10-year period, with the contractor to receive an
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amount in proportion to his share in cost overruns. The flexible
incentive clause includes an automatic adjustment of performance
awards as the cost share changes.
Both contracts provide for 90% progress payments during
the RDT&E and production effort until such time as payments for
hardware deliveries have reduced the contractor's unrecovered costs
to a stated amount, at which time future progress payments will be
made at 70% of total costs.
Correction of Deficiencies clauses in both contracts extend
the time period in which actionable deficiencies in the total sys
tems may be discovered, in order to include an adequate opportunity
for utilization of each item of hardware in an operational environ
ment. Costs involved in correcting such deficiencies are allowable
costs under the terms of the incentive contract, but no adjustments
are made in target price or ceiling price.
In recognition of the potential for disputes between the
airframe and engine contractors as to responsibility for correction
of deficiencies in the total system arising in an operational en
vironment, and the resultant difficulty in assessing responsibility
as between the two prime contractors, the airframe contract provides
that given the airframe contractor's concurrence in the original
engine specifications, any changes thereto, and the demonstrated
compliance with those specifications, the airframe contractor will,
as to the Government, assume responsibility for correction of any
deficiencies in the total system. The Air Force has agreed to allo
cate costs of correcting such deficiencies between the contracts as
determined by the airframe and engine contractors pursuant to an
agreement to which the Government is not a party.
Although each contract calls for an RDT&E and production
effort covering several years, a limitation on the Government's
total liability in each year has been included which establishes a
ceiling in the event of termination for convenience in that year.
Despite the magnitude of the initial efforts required by
both the Government and the myriad number of contractors and sub
contractors involved in the C-5A competition, application of the
TPPC to the C-5A procurement is believed, on balance, to be an un
qualified success. The largest plus factor apparent at this time
was the Air Force's ability to engender performance and price compe
tition on an initial acquisition program of about 2 billion dollars,
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which will approximate 3 billion dollars if the competitively
priced options are exercised.
Acceptance of the historical premise that only a small
portion of this program would otherwise have been acquired in a
truly price competitive environment, and application of the
Department's historically generated price competition costreduction factor of 25%, gives a quick and dirty answer to any
would-be critics of the Concept. To this must be added the inherent
cost economies allowed for by a multi-year buy.
No historical factor has been established for potential
cost reduction arising from the contractor's motivation to design
for economical production and reliability and simplicity of
maintenance,10/ nor from his motivation to obtain supplies and
services from the most efficient sources, whether in-house or by
outside contract, but the effects on total cost to the Government
cannot be disregarded.
Similarly, the tightening of design and configuration
discipline on both the Government and the contractors, both prior
to and during the program, must have a beneficial effect by re
ducing the need for changes during the program. Other opportuni
ties for economy, inherent in a concept which places maximum
responsibility on the contractor for not only economic production,
but economic operation as well, arise from the cost and performance
incentives of the contract and will be garnered in years to come as
reflected in the final acquisition and operating cost of the system.
Paled by the magnitude of the benefits derived, but never
theless of substantial import when viewed individually, is the vast
amount of national resources expended by both the Government and
industry prior to contract award. Total competing contractor and
subcontractor costs have been estimated to have exceeded 100
million dollars. Government resources expended, in addition to
those involved in preparation of the 1500 page initial RFP and the
approximately like number of pages of the clarifications issued
during contract definition, include the 132,000 man-hours spent by
source selection evaluating teams as well as time spent by higher
echelons in coordinating and reviewing the teams' efforts to
analyze and evaluate some 240,000 pages of data.
To summarize its benefits, it is believed that Total
Package procurement will evoke competitive proposals involving
neither "buy-in" bidding nor overcontingencies with respect to
27

performance or cost, that the contracts resulting therefrom will
provide a framework in which respectable profits can be earned if
the contractors meet their commitments and are in fact efficient,
and that the Government will pay the lowest reasonable price for
products of the desired quality.
VI.

THE FUTURE OF THE TOTAL PACKAGE CONCEPT

The already demonstrated benefits of application of the
TPPC to the C-5A program, without more, have been enough to engender
considerable interest in the Concept and its potential applications.
Identification of potential and preparation for Total Package con
tracting in the Air Force SRAM,11/ the Navy FDL,12/ and other pro
grams attests to this fact. The Director of Defense Research and
Engineering has asked the Air Force for a comprehensive analysis of
its C-5A procurement experience to be distributed through his office
to all Secretarial level OSD and Service offices dealing with In
stallations and Logistics and Research and Development. The Assis
tant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) has asked
the Air Force to prepare a statement of broad policy guidelines for
the application of the Concept for Department of Defense-wide im
plementation through the Armed Services Procurement Regulation
Committee.
How wide an application the Concept will have within the
Department of Defense is a function of many variables, some of which
pertain to the basic requirements of our defense posture and its
relationship to conditions in a constantly changing world. The
Concept must be limited to cases where the technical factors and
risks, and the product, can be defined within reasonable limits.
But these limits are broader than one might suppose, for several
reasons. Increasingly over the past several years, DOD has embarked
on advanced development programs intended to establish experimen
tally the feasibility of subsystems and components before full
development is initiated. This is the building block approach.
Thus, for example, in the C-5A, significant technical ad
vances in the engine were needed to decrease fuel consumption and
increase thrust, well beyond the then state-of-the-art. But several
years prior to the initiation of the C-5A development, the Air Force
funded a series of developments of engine components, and the testing
of so-called demonstrator engines which incorporated certain critical
structural, mechanical and aerodynamic features. Thus, the technical
difficulties, even on a frontier-probing development, were identifi
able and assessable before contractor commitments were made. Further,
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the wide variety of cost incentive patterns, including the
flexible incentive, permits the contractual arrangement to be
tailored to the risk.
Consequently, if Contract Definition and the building
block approach are pursued, most development-production programs
will be candidates for Total Package procurement.
Other variables in determining the application of the
Concept depend primarily on the selection techniques used to
identify those systems that should be acquired.13/
Within the above constraints, the extent to which the
Concept might be applied is a function of the benefits to be
achieved as weighed against the disadvantages to be endured on the
basis of a case-by-case analysis of the procurement involved. In
view of its success to date in the C-5A program, maximum efforts
are being made to eliminate, insofar as is possible, the problems
experienced in that application.
As discussed above, one area of concern is the massive
Government and industry efforts expended prior to and during the
C-5A Source Selection period. While these efforts represented a
marked increase over those expended prior to contract award in
other programs, it should not be assumed that all, or even a sub
stantial part, of such effort was unnecessary or of marginal
utility. Inasmuch as the C-5A procurement was a vehicle for the
initial application of full-scale contract definition and the
AFSC - 375 management series as well as the TPPC, it is difficult
to ascertain what, if any, significant extra effort was required
by the Total Package approach.
Clearly, both contract definition and the 375 series are
designed to require more thought and analysis by both Government
and industry prior to contract award. The fact that more than one
contractor is undertaking this effort, thereby automatically in
creasing the total industry effort and consequently the Government's
evaluation efforts, is recognized as desirable by the Contract
Definition Directive. The logical premise for this approach is the
anticipation that greater efforts in a competitive environment prior
to contract award will be more than offset by reduction of post
award effort and consequently result in lower program costs and
higher technical performance. Extension of this approach to a Total
Package procurement indicates that any additional effort required in
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obtaining price and performance commitments will be offset by
elimination of the post-development effort involved in negotiating
definitive production, support and spares contracts on an annual
basis, especially in a sole source environment.
In spite of these valid reasons for increased efforts
prior to contract award, the Air Force’s C-5A experience indicates
that considerable room for improvement does exist. Government and
industry effort in the precontract award period is designed to re
sult in a verification that the system should, in fact, be developed
and produced, selection of a source, and the execution of a defini
tive contract. Therefore, any effort expended must be evaluated in
the light of its materiality to one or more of these goals. Orderly
time-phasing of these efforts in terms of contractor generation and
Government evaluation of data provides an opportunity for economy of
manpower utilization not unrelated to a production learning curve.
Clearly, the stated goals of CD can be accomplished se
quentially, thereby utilizing the educational benefits of prior in
volvement. Limitation of Government and industry effort prior to
award to these stated goals is especially important in a competitive
situation where the efforts of one or more of the losers, and the
related Government effort expended in other areas, may be largely
for naught. Thus, in addition to the sequential efforts approach,
which should be undertaken in any contract definition, the key maxim
of any competitive contract definition must be "Put off until to
morrow (post-selection) anything you don’t have to do today (pre
selection)."
The Total Package approach itself offers two potential
areas for reduction in pre-award effort. A substantial portion of
the C-5A pre-award effort was in the preparation and evaluation of
data required by the Government in order to provide a base for con
tinuing data requirements designed to provide the Government with
sufficient information upon which to exercise its management respon
sibilities. The Total Package Concept, by obtaining price and per
formance commitments at the outset of a program and providing in
centives structured to motivate the contractor to make decisions to
his and the Government’s best interests, places a much greater
responsibility on the contractor, and the Government's responsi
bility should decrease accordingly. This shift in responsibility
should obviate the need for much of the continuing information re
quirement during the program and consequently the requirement for
a data base during CD.
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Moreover, where a contractor undertakes price and per
formance commitments in a truly competitive environment, the extent
of the Government's evaluation efforts during source selection
should be substantially decreased. The competitive atmosphere
guards against conservatism, while the contractual commitment guards
against "puffing." Thus, detail analysis of cost and pricing data
may not be required prior to contract award. Likewise, detail
technical evaluation of proposed designs to determine the validity
of performance commitments may be capable of being reduced in the
pre-award period.
This is not to say that detail cost and design data should
not be required after award, if necessary, nor that application of
a selective audit technique to both cost and technical proposals
during source selection is undesirable. It is only intended that
recognition be given to the fact that an earlier selection14/ has
designated the competitors as being the most capable of developing
and producing the system, and that each of the competitors, spurred
on by the competition and constrained by the spectre of financial
loss, is not likely to propose much more or less than he is con
vinced he can achieve.
In addition to an analysis of the magnitude of the precon
tract effort, an evaluation is also being made to assure that appli
cation of the Concept in Operational Systems Development does not
inhibit creativity on the part of the contractor. The contrary may
well be the case. The Concept provides great latitude for, and
directly encourages, creativity as explained below.
1.

Competition spurs all of us on to greater efforts.

a. In a cost effectiveness-type competition, the
contractor is encouraged to optimize performance in terms of a
productivity/cost relationship.
b. The source selection activity's attention is
directed to total cost (investment, operation and maintenance) vs.
mission performance relationships, rather than development cost vs.
technological considerations; thereby allowing the contractor
greater latitude to propose high cost development work which will
substantially decrease production, maintenance or operating costs.
2. Identification of end items and establishment of end
item performance specifications during CD is not peculiar to Total
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Package acquisition, but rather, is a prerequisite to Engineering
or Operational Systems Development as well.
3.
While the Total Package approach and the consequent
emphasis on accuracy of development and production cost estimates
may require the contractor to engage in some design effort during
CD, this by no means locks him in to the design upon which his
Total Package proposal is based. If anything, these designs serve
only as a baseline from which the contractor is motivated by the
inclusion of cost and performance incentives in the Total Package
contract to apply his ingenuity and creativity during the develop
ment stage. A flexible cost incentive with a related "total cost"
(R&D, Production, Facilities, Maintenance, and Operation) over
"productivity" incentive provides a contractor with maximum lati
tude for application of creative effort, and more important, rewards
him handsomely when such efforts are successful.
In a situation where the benefits to be gained must be
weighed against the efforts to be expended, reduction in precontract
effort will automatically expand the field of potential application
of the Concept. Nevertheless, new applications must consider the
magnitude of the new benefits to be derived. The C-5A experience
involved a competitive CD for a system designated for Operational
Systems Development -- that is, full-scale engineering development
and substantial production. This is clearly the most fertile
situation for obtaining maximum incremental benefit from application
of the Concept. When competition for some reason is not possible,
the effort required for Total Package contracting must be weighed
against the remaining advantages15/.
Elimination of substantial production as in a straight
Engineering Development Program involving only hardware for test
and evaluation, reduces the area of benefit, but likewise reduces
the precontract effort involved. In fact, the Department of Defense
has been procuring such work as Total Package acquisitions for many
years. Reciprocally, elimination of a substantial RDT&E effort, as
in advertised procurements of off-the-shelf and commercially
available items, likewise reduces the area of benefit and the pre
contract effort required. Whether such programs should be con
sidered for Total Package procurement with regard to production
and support equipment, including operation and training equipment,
together with support services, should be an individual decision
made by balancing the reduced benefits against the reduced precon
tract effort.
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The immediate impetus for additional Total Package appli
cations would seem to be in the area of competitive Operational
System Development. The determinative factor in application to any
such program should be the degree of stability of the engineering
and production aspects of the program and the level of confidence
that the program will not for any other reason change appreciably
prior to introducing the system or equipment into the defense inven
tory. The sub-factors which influence this determination are (1)
degree of technical risk, (2) certainty of system characteristics
and requirements, (3) interface with an unstable system, (4) sta
bility of force structure and production quantities required, and
(5) feasibility and practicability of competing the program. It
should be recognized that all of the above sub-factors are in
fluenced by the degree of planning and effort expended prior to
and during CD.
The greater the degree of planning applied prior to con
tract award, the greater the potential for application of the TPPC.
Thus, no automatic barometer for application should be derived. Ad
vance planning and good judgment will always be required to set the
stage for successful applications. Moreover, the Concept itself has
not been defined in detail and does not establish rigorous require
ments in its application. Refinements will continue to be made and
adjustments to a particular situation should be encouraged.
In short, the future of Total Package contracting depends
solely on the continuation of the preponderance of benefits to be
derived over the effort required -- which in turn depends on the
ingenuity and imagination demonstrated by both Government and
industry in suiting the concept to future programs.
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FOOTNOTES

1/

Referred to hereafter as "the Department" or "DOD."

2/

See Fortune, November 1965; Space Age News, October
1965; Time Magazine, October 8, 1965.

3/

Referred to hereafter as "the Concept" or "TPPC."

4/

"Operational System Developments - Include research and
development effort directed toward development, engineering
and test of systems, support programs, vehicles and weapons
that have been approved for production and Service employ
ment. This area is included for convenience in considering
all RDT&E projects. All items in this area are major line
item projects which appear as RDT&E Costs of Weapon System
Elements in other programs. Program control will thus be
exercised by review of the individual research and develop
ment effort in each Weapon System Element." DOD Directive
3200.6 (Incl 3) dated June 7, 1962.

5/

CPFF defined and explained at ASPR 3-405.5.
FFP defined and explained at ASPR 3-404.2.
FPI defined and explained at ASPR 3-404.4.

6/

Negotiation of price on a production contract begins with
cost negotiation and then proceeds to fee negotiation to
result in a negotiated price or target price. Fee negotia
tion is in the form of a percentage to be applied to the
cost established in the cost negotiation. The percentage,
under the weighted guideline approach set forth in ASPR
3-808, reflects the resources to be applied and the risks
to be undertaken by the contractor. While percentages
vary from contract to contract, the greatest potential for
fee maximization remains in the negotiation of a high
estimated or target cost, and this in turn evolves from an
analysis of the cost of the development hardware. Unfor
tunately, development of a high cost item leads to greater
profit on production and follow-on support contracts.

7/

DOD Directive 3200.9, dated July 1, 1965.
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8/

The extent of a competition relates to the quantitative
area in which the competitors will be judged. If you ask
men to ride a mile on horseback, but tell them that the
winner will be selected on the basis of the first 1/4
mile, it can hardly be assumed that competition will exist
over the last 3/4 miles. Similarly, the form of a competi
tion relates to the qualitative criteria upon which competi
tors will be judged. In the case of the horsemen, this is
demonstrated by the differences between a competition in
which points are awarded for form and one in which points
are awarded on the basis of position at the finish line.
Finally, the intensity of a competition relates to the
quality and motivation of the competition, which is usually
a function of the wealth and/or prestige attached to the
prize.

9/

This clause is discussed in the text dealing with main
taining price commitments (page 11).

10/

A rough estimate of potential savings can be drawn by analogy
from Value Engineering (VE) savings potential. The Depart
ment considers 10% of contract price as a modest approximation
of potential VE savings on production and operational costs.
Application of this factor to the production portion of a
Total Package contract would be conservative, inasmuch as
many opportunities for production and operating cost savings
are lost in the initial design phase and can never be regained
by VE.

11/

SRAM is the acronym for a Short Range Attack Missile for use
in an air-to-ground environment.

12/

FDL is the acronym for a Fast Deployment Logistic Ship with
rapid cargo handling capabilities and embarked lighterage
and helicopters for over-the-beach unloading in the absence
of port facilities.

13/

Responsibility for policy generation in these areas lies
with the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis).
Policy so promulgated will, as in the case of the potential
for application of TPPC in the C-5A, SRAM, FDL and other
programs, have a direct effect on procurement techniques.
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14/

DOD Directive 3200.9 requires a source selection in
accordance with DOD Directive 4105.62, April 6, 1965,
to choose the contractor or contractors to undertake
a contract definition program.

15/

See anticipated benefits of TPPC in text (page 3).
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